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ECONOMIC ISSUES IN STATE REGULATION
OF CONSUMER CREDIT
ROBERT J. MCEWEN, S.J.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, Professor E. R. A. Seligman opened a session
of the annual meeting of the Academy of Political Sciences with a very
thoughtful and farsighted paper on "Economic Problems Involved in
Installment Selling." With remarkable insight, he concluded his paper
with the following warning:
[I] t must not be forgotten that installment selling, like every
institution, is subject to the perils of novelty. If this were the
time to deal with the subject fully, it could be pointed out
that in the course of history credit has assumed manifold
forms; and each new form of credit has had to fight its way
to recognition after going through three stages: that of initial
growth, that of the sloughing off of abuses, and that of the
final emergence of the soundness of the principle.
. While [installment selling] ... has undoubtedly come to
stay, all manner of abuses and of perils which it would be
shortsighted to deny have crept in. What is needed is a sober
and impartial analysis of its true significance. As the years
roll by, outworn methods will be discarded; new corruptions
will appear. Is it not the part of wisdom to separate the chaff
from the grain; to be on our guard against the more obvious
dangers; and to eliminate . . . improper practices . . . ?'
Today, state regulation has become an important, but much misunder-
stood phase of the community's attempt through government action
* A.B., Boston College, 1940; MA., Fordham University, 1943; S.T.L., Weston
College, 1947; Ph.D., Boston College, 1957; Former Chairman, Massachusetts Consumer
Council; President, Council on Consumer Information, 1965-1967; Associate Professor
and Chairman of Department of Economics, Boston College.
1 Seligman, Economic Problems Involved in Installment Selling, 12 Acad. Pol. Sri.
Proc. 583, 594 (1927).
387
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to insure that the economic processes of borrowing and lending promote
the general public welfare.
If they are to be sound, arguments for enacting legal control of
consumer credit must rely on the best economic and social research and
analysis available. Unfortunately for the public interest, in this as in
many other areas of policymaking through legislation, pressures from
pecuniary self-interest are so great that they lead to enormous con-
cealment of fact and distortion of analysis To uncover the real eco-
nomic issues underlying state consumer-credit laws is the primary
purpose of this article.' Three issues are selected for extended dis-
cussion, mainly because of their appearance in credit-industry argu-
ments presented in the course of debate on consumer-credit legislation.
1. What is the precise definition of consumer credit? Are legal
regulations commensurate with the appropriate economic definitions?
2. What must the state do to establish framework conditions on
both the demand and the supply side of the consumer-credit market in
order to make it function more effectively and more in the public inter-
est? On the demand side of the market this refers particularly to state
action requiring disclosure of information useful to the customer. On
the supply side this refers to state control of operating methods of the
companies, with particular reference to selling and collection practices,
credit-rating bureaus, and the relationship of financing agencies to
sellers of merchandise.
3. Can competition be relied upon to produce fair rates after the
state has established the framework conditions surrounding the
market? If competition in the market cannot be relied upon, then
should the state set rates, or should the state set ceilings far above the
prevailing rates and designed merely to ward off instances of gross
extortion?
II. DEFINITION OF CONSUMER CREDIT
A definition of consumer credit is necessary in order to identify
and classify the realities of that to which regulation might be directed.
2 It should be emphasized that this article is by no means a complete treatment of
the importance or significance of consumer credit in the functioning of the national
economy. The questions raised by this issue include the following: (I) Does consumer
credit constitute a destabilizing force in the economy? Does it really stimulate consumer
saving? (2) In enabling him to enjoy goods and services before accumulating the income
to pay cash for them, does consumer credit benefit or harm the consumer? (3) Does
consumer credit benefit producers by expanding product markets and allowing the
production economies that go with an increased volume? (4) If the objective and
subjective gains from the use of credit, whether they be monetary or nonmonetary, are
greater than the costs, is not consumer welfare really increased? These questions have
been raised by economic writers since the earliest days of installment credit. See Neufeld,
The Economic Significance of Consumer Credit, in Consumer Credit in Canada 5 (Ziegel
& 011ey ed. 1966).
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In a sense, definitions are names we agree to give to things, and the
most important element is precision of expression and consistency of
use both by the definer and by all others dealing with the same reality.
It is quite true that a definition, to be meaningful, must be related to the
purpose of the discussion in which it is used. For this reason, legal and
economic definitions do not have to withstand the same tests. In eco-
nomic analysis, for instance, trends in the magnitude of consumer credit
are important items of information. For legal purposes, however, the
precise nature and essence of the business transactions are more im-
portant than their volume or fluctuation.
One way to define consumer credit is to say that it is purchasing
power advanced to individual consumers, usually in relatively small
amounts, for the purchase of consumer goods and services. 3 This defini-
tion advances the present discussion only insofar as it includes all those
transactions to which consumer-credit legislation can reasonably be
directed. Because of the difficulties in classifying types of credit, the
definition, to be helpful, must be construed broadly. If legislation cannot
precisely include those activities which are capable of producing the
evil sought to be prevented, it seems more appropriate, in view of the
desired objectives, that such legislation be overinclusive rather than
underinclusive.
The difficulties inherent in defining and classifying the various
types of consumer credit were well stated by Albert Hart:
The loan classification of the Federal Reserve . . . shows
a mixture of at least three classification principles: (A) the
line of business in which the borrower is engaged . . .; (B)
the type of collateral . . .; (C) the purpose of the loan . .
Since the "purpose" of a loan can often be described in sev-
eral, alternative ways, many economists are skeptical of
principle C. If either A or B—preferably both—could be
carried consistently across the whole mass of loans, bank
statistics would be more illuminating.'
In viewing broadly the nature of consumer credit, therefore, one must
consider an important principle more properly applied to all credit and
not just to consumer credit:
The purpose of consumer credit is to enable the borrower to
enjoy income before he has earned it or received it. Consumer
credit comes into existence whenever an individual acquires
3
 As normally used in banking statistics, the figures for consumer credit exclude
borrowing for investment in securities, real estate, or home construction.
4
 Hart, Money, Debt, Economic Activity 55 (2d ed. 1953).
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funds or goods for personal use in return for a promise to pay
for the same in the future"
An important economic truth which is embodied in this quotation has,
unhappily, been freely ignored and distorted by legislators and courts
for too many years. It should be emphasized that credit or a loan is
involved in every exchange in which there is delay in completing the
transaction. In any case in which the buyer does not render payment
to the seller upon acquisition of the seller's goods or services, the
economic reality of the situation requires us to acknowledge that the
seller is making a loan to the buyer of the value of those goods or
services for as long a period as it takes the buyer to complete his pay-
ment.° This concept is of ten obscured and disfigured by legislated
subterfuge, either to avoid the honest statement of actual interest and
finance charges or to evade legally prescribed maximum rates of inter-
est. Its importance, however, requires that it be embodied in the defini-
tion of consumer credit.
A difficulty in a definition as a basis for regulation can arise be-
cause of the nature of the goods for which consumer credit is used. The
general distinction between a consumer good and a producer good is
frequently obvious; there are not too many overlapping or indistinguish-
able cases that present much difficulty. However, it does make sense
to conceive of consumer credit as any method by which an individual
consumer has access to immediate purchasing power, in return for
which he obligates himself to make specified future payments out of
his income. Thus, a definition should include the transactions which
permit the consumer to acquire certain goods that might also be con-
sidered producer goods. Furthermore, in those cases where an item that
is ordinarily a consumer good can also be used as a producer good (e.g.,
an automobile), it would seem that legal regulations on the matter
should tend to include all loans made for that particular good, on the
theory that no great harm will be done by overinclusion, but that great
complexity and harm may result from opening loopholes that might be
exploited. Because of the nature of personal cash loans, it seems ap-
propriate to include all such loans under the heading of consumer credit
without attempting to find out whether the money will be spent to buy a
consumer good, to pay off previous debts incurred for the purchase of
consumer goods, to lend the proceeds to an uncle for the purchase of
securities, or to put the funds to any of the hundreds of uses consumers
can find for the proceeds of personal loans.
5 Stokes & Arlt, Money, Banking and the Financial System 593 (1955).
6 Writers of books on credit frequently admit this point in early chapters and then
proceed to ignore it in subtle attempts to justify the "time-price differential." See
Bartels, Credit Management 4 (1967); Neufeld, Manual on Consumer Credit 4, 88-92
(1961).
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What has been said so far about the difficulty of defining and
isolating consumer credit emphasizes the problem of data-gathering in
this field.' From an economic point of view, the main objective of
gathering such information is the ascertainment of significant trends
in the use of credit—trends that may have important bearing on the
national economy as a whole or on the behavior of consumers speci-
fically. From the particular point of view of protecting individual con-
sumers, all credit transactions should be included in which research has
uncovered some element of deception or abuse. On this principle, we
must recognize the unreality of the legal distinction between cash credit
and vendor credit. No useful analytical purpose is served by the
attempt to separate transactions of this sort. They are each in essence
one and the same thing—a postponement of one half of the exchange
transaction. Thus, both must be included in the definition of consumer
credit.
Care should be taken to exclude from coverage those transactions
which are not forms of consumer credit, even though they may include
consumer-credit elements. Some authors, for example, attempt to
identify lease arrangements as a form of consumer credit' Such a
classification, however, appears to be a mistake, because there really is
no granting of credit in a lease. With the possible exception of lease
arrangements that include an option to purchase at the end of the term,
straight leases are nothing more than the purchase, for a fixed amount,
of a specified service for a specified time. For instance, if one leases
an automobile for a week or a month, he purchases for a price expressed
simply in dollars the use of this machine for that period of time.
Since everything is "pay as you go," such economic transactions do not
belong under the heading of consumer credit.° To call these arrange-
ments merely other means of financing simply confuses the picture. It
is true that, in a long-term lease, the lessee obligates himself to definite
payments for definite future time periods. But these payments are
tied to the enjoyment of definite future services which the lessor
obligates himself to provide. In effect, the lessee is as much granting the
lessor credit as the lessor is granting it to the lessee. Moreover, if the
leased item should be destroyed, the lease ceases to operate. The con-
tinued existence of a consumer good purchased on time, however, in no
way affects the validity of the installment contract; money which has
been advanced must be repaid.
7 See generally Jones, Measurement of Consumer Credit, 48 U. Ill. Bull. 83-99 (1951).
8 See, e.g., The Mortgaged Society, Forbes, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 51.
9 It should be noted, however, that credit can be extended in conjunction with a
lease arrangement. To the extent that use of the leased item precedes payment for such
use, the lessor has extended credit to the lessee, in the same manner that a vendor
grants credit to a vendee by permitting use before payment.
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A recent article in Forbes discussed a "new look" at personal
debt, and by implication suggested that adoption of this view would
make discussion of consumer credit more meaningful.
Some economists—notably economists in the Federal
Government and in the nation's major corporations—argue
that a whole new look should be taken at exactly what is
personal debt. If renting an apartment is not considered a
debt but a cost, is it fair to assess mortgage payments as
"credit" payments? If a man signs a three-year lease at $150
a month, isn't he as much "in debt" (for $5,400) as a man
who borrows money to buy a house? Similarly, no one regards
the cost of going to work by commuter train as "going into
debt." Should payments on a car used for the same purpose
be regarded as evidence of debt? Isn't much of what is now
called consumer debt merely a replacement for services that
people used to buy?"
Unfortunately, this supposed insight is not an improvement but a
further confusion. Credit laws should be aimed at protection of owner
as borrower, not as user, and thus consumer credit must be defined
accordingly—in terms of borrower.
It is important to distinguish carefully between the product or the
service obtained by a purchaser and the time and the source of the
funds or other thing of value by which the transaction is consummated.
If there is any delay between the obtaining of the good or service and
the handing over of its equivalent price in goods, or more commonly
money, then we have an instance of consumer credit. Someone—the
purchaser—has come into possession of useful assets whose employ-
ment could otherwise produce a return to the person in control or
possession of them. Whether the repayment interval be small or great,
the possession of assets or the enjoyment of services prior to the fulfill-
ment of the other side of the exchange is properly called credit. The law
can reasonably decide which varieties of credit phenomena present
problems of public welfare that deserve control, but the law should
never speak or act as if certain transactions do not involve credit when
essentially they do, nor as if certain transactions do involve credit when
essentially they do not.
III. LEGAL CONTROL OF MARKET FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS
Most economists would agree on the fundamental requirements for
the proper functioning of a mixed capitalistic economy such as exists
in the United States today. Given the proper institutional framework,
10 The Mortgaged Society, supra note 8, at 51.
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free producer and consumer decisions—to buy and sell, to save and
invest, to produce this product or that product—lead to the best possible
allocation of resources. Such choices must be made through a market
operating within a social framework which is at least partially the result
of legal requirements. Strictly speaking, these legal requirements are
not interferences with market operation, but instead are needed guide-
lines or boundaries which preserve the possibility of a truly free and
informed expression of buyers' and sellers' preferences in the market.
From the buyer's point of view, the two chief requirements are
adequacy of information on which to base a rational choice and freedom
from any coercion that could force his choice along certain lines. From
the point of view of the selling side of the market, fairness requires that
there must be no collusion or constraints on the offerings of competing
sellers. Because the system is fueled by self-interest, legal proscriptions
to prevent forms of monopolistic control, deceit, and misrepresentation
are absolutely essential to the proper operation of a market economy.
Only then is there a possibility of achieving maximum consumer
welfare. For this reason, even the most libertarian economists and
political scientists should and do logically accept the principle of some
legal control of consumer credit. What matters is that the controls
promise to accomplish the objectives italicized above.
The justification for governmental control of consumer credit, as
well as of credit in general, is closely intertwined with the economic
nature of money and credit." Indeed, in most modern economies, many
transactions between buyer and seller, or borrower and lender, are based
ultimately upon the lender having access to the money-creating powers
of the commercial-banking system.' As R. I. Robinson put it:
The collective demands of consumers for credit are chan-
neled back to the money and capital markets through a
variety of financial institutions. The most important and also
the most complex of these institutions in the market are
commercial banks. Commercial banks have at least three
different channels of extending credit to consumers: they do
it directly in the form of cash loans, they purchase installment
paper from the auto and other dealers who originate it, and
11 Bartels, op. cit. supra note 6, at 474, states: "Still another criterion of the
stature of credit in our economy is the extent and manner in which it has been subjected
to social regulation. This is an indication of the esteem in which it is held and of the
disrepute which it has attained."
12 The commercial-banking system creates new checkbook money in the form of
demand deposits when it makes loans to borrowers. Its money-creating power arises
from the fractional reserve requirements against demand deposits permitted by the
Federal Reserve System under authority from Congress. Almost 80% of the U.S. money
stock in the hands of the public consists of deposit money. See Whittlesey, Freedman &
Herman, Money and Banking 20 (1963).
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they lend to sales or consumer finance companies that make
loans or buy paper."
In the last analysis, these money-creating powers are delegated by the
federal government itself. This provides an additional reason then, for
governments at all levels to be sensitive to the need for legal controls
over practices associated with lending and borrowing. State regulation
of consumer-credit practices generally includes the following provisions:
(1) licensing of firms engaged in this activity; (2) detailed require-
ments pertaining to contract terms and to practical methods of oper-
ating by such firms; (3) some stipulations about rates or maximum
charges; and (4) supervision, examination, and code enforcement by a
state agency, usually the bank commissioner.
A. The Capital Market
The consumer-credit market is only a tiny segment of the much
larger and economically crucial capital market. On the demand side of
the capital market are grouped the entrepreneurs or producers who
have plans for expansion of production and need to borrow capital.
They expect to sell their goods at a margin great enough to yield a
profit over and above the sum necessary to pay the interest cost of the
borrowed capital. Many agencies catering to the demands for consumer
credit are in fact on both sides of the market. They are on the demand
side of the capital market because they anticipate putting borrowed
funds to work by lending them to consumers, thereby earning sufficient
income to pay the interest cost of the borrowed capital and to create
profits for themselves.
On the supply side of the general capital market are all those
financial agencies that specialize in attracting and collecting income
from "savers." "Savers" are those people willing to forego temporarily
the use of newly earned income in return for interest. In addition to
this source of supply of capital funds, the commercial-banking system,
operating under federal-reserve requirements, can provide a further
source of funds that have never been income and are newly created
demand-deposit money. Thus, the supply side of the capital market is
made up of two rather different segments.
Consumers of goods and services (including the services of money-
lenders) appear in the capital market only indirectly through the
agencies (e.g., banks and finance agencies), whose credit is much
stronger. Consumer-credit demand, therefore, as anticipated by these
financial intermediaries, is translated into the demand side of the
13 Robinson, Money and Capital Markets 261-62 (1964). For a comparison of the
roles played by commercial banks and financial intermediaries in this process, see Smith,
Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Controls, 73 Q.J. Econ. 535 (1959).
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capital market, and the bidding prices create the interest rate when
they interact with the supply prices of lenders."
It is entirely possible that defects in the demand side of the con-
sumer-credit market can affect the prices paid in the other parts of the
capital market. Imperfections in both the demand side and the supply
side of the consumer-credit market itself are of concern not merely to
consumers, but to everyone interested in the proper functioning of
interest rates in capital markets. If the imperfections of the consumer-
credit market are such as to attract into consumer lending (through
artificially high rates) an excessive amount of the total supply of loan-
able funds, this inevitably has a disruptive effect upon the productive
side of the economy. Some entrepreneurs would be denied funds com-
pletely, while others would be made to pay a higher rate of interest
than if consumer-credit rates were lower. Therefore, an understanding
of the real demand from the consumer-credit side would contribute to
a general improvement in the functioning of the whole economic system.
B. Demand Side of the Consumer-Credit Market
On the demand side of the consumer-credit market, the most
important question is whether or not borrowers are in a position to
understand the charges they are paying for consumer credit, because,
without this understanding, a rational decision as to whether or not to
borrow cannot be made. In most consumer-credit transactions, terms are
stated as "add-on" or discount charges or as monthly dollar payments.
Often borrowers, or purchasers, have no idea of the price they are
paying for credit, as compared to the knowledge they have of the
interest rates they receive on savings deposits or government bonds,
for example.
One of the most important legal regulations suggested by con-
sumer associations is the requirement that lenders state charges in
terms of simple annual interest rates. The basic notion of a rate is
nothing more than a measure of flow—of water, income, or what have
you. Every rate is a ratio involving a time period, a base amount, and an
increment related to that base over the time period. An annual interest
rate is derived from the number of dollars which must be paid to
borrow one hundred dollars for a year. It is what the market establishes
as the price that borrowers pay for command over present purchas-
ing power and that lenders receive for relinquishing command over
14 Here again, it is useful to put to rest once and for all the artificial attempt to
inject a distinction between "pure" interest rate (the actual interest cost) and other
service costs or charges associated with the demand for funds. As many others have
pointed out, there is practically no interest rate anywhere in the economy that is not a
mixture of elements of pure interest, service charges, and risk elements.
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present purchasing power for one year.' This form of disclosure has
been resisted by most lending agencies. In doing so, however, the op-
ponents of annual-rate disclosure completely ignore the fact that con-
sumers are always beset with annual-rate quotations when banks and
lending institutions attempt to attract savings and deposits from the
public. The necessity for a consumer to compare what he is able to
earn when he puts his money in a bank with what it will cost him when
he takes money out of a bank—the necessity of having these com-
parisons available in identical percentage terms—is a chief and most
compelling consumer argument for disclosure of annual-rate informa-
tion.
The opponents of such disclosure generally attempt to draw fine
distinctions among the actual cost elements in the charges on loans.
For instance, Professor Robert Johnson has said:
Examination of the operating costs of credit institutions
reveals that the dominant component of this "credit package"
is the service element, that only a relatively small portion of
the finance charge paid by the consumer can be attributed to
pure interest.
... Because the major component of a consumer finance
charge is for service and risk, it is more properly viewed as a
service charge.
If it is treated as a service charge, the consumer finance
charge need not be converted into an annual rate. Indeed most
service charges are presented in much the same manner as
finance charges are now stated to the consumer. 16
Two comments are in order. First, what Johnson says about the
components of cost included in the credit package is correct, but it is
likewise applicable to any and every interest rate charged either to con-
sumers or to businesses." Second, the fact that service charges have
long been presented in a certain way does not at all mean that their
conversion into an annual rate could not be done and would not be an
improvement. As far as the borrower is concerned, all types of charges
are the same: they are part of the total cost of credit to him. What the
consumer needs to know is whether 5 per cent interest from a savings
bank provides a better use of his funds than paying off what is called
a "4 Y2 per cent" auto loan. It usually does not, and it is highly un-
15 The function of interest rates is so critical to the operation of the economy that
sophisticated commercial dealers convert practically every financial instrument and
financial transaction into percentage terms. This is done to make as fine a profit calcula-
tion as possible, to guide the businessman in the selection of the most profitable invest-
ment of his assets.
16 Johnson, Methods of Stating Consumer Finance Charges 14 (1961).
17 Messner, Social Ethics, Natural Law in the Western World 814-15 (rev. ed. 1965).
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fortunate that communications media are bombarded with such mis-
leading advertisements."
According to the opponents of annual-rate statement, "the most
appealing of the arguments for use of the interest-rate form of state-
ment is that it will enable consumers to shop more effectively for
credit."" They concede that this argument implies also that this more
effective shopping for credit will generally reduce its cost. In addition,
some of these opponents, notably Professor Johnson, allege the
"impossibility" of expressing finance charges as annual rates. There
are two main objections proposed by Professor Johnson: (1) "The
finance charge can be buried in the prices of items sold on credit"; and
(2) "The charge cannot be computed at the time credit is granted on
a wide variety of credit transactions."'
Let us examine these two arguments and their implications. It is
perhaps true that a retailer could raise the price of a product and
either totally eliminate any mention of installment financing or quote a
ridiculously low rate. The total elimination of explicit finance charges
occurs even now in some types of credit-card and department-store
credit, for instance, when one gets thirty-day "free" credit. However,
the consumer, as long as he has a single price to deal with, is perfectly
able to compare the price on the goods or services he is getting with
prices for that same benefit in competing stores. This goes on all the
time, and the consumer is well accustomed to handling these situa-
tions. The popularity of discount stores, which have eliminated such
18 The attempt to distinguish lender profit from borrower interest is a determined, if
misguided, one. Ray McAllister, speaking of revolving credit and installment credit, noted
that
these ... seem to be interest rates, which in fact they are not since in both types
of credit interest "on the use of money" represents only a part of the total
credit costs.
It is argued that because regular installment credit charges are not usually
expressed as a "true" annual rate it is improper to express revolving credit
charges as a true annual rate. Again, it is pointed out, this would equate the
charge for revolving credit in the mind of the buyer with an interest rate,
which it is not.
McAllister, An Analysis of Proposed Federal Legislation Covering Consumer Instalment
Credit, in Business Studies 31, 38 (No. Tex. State Univ. Fall 1966).
10 Johnson, op. cit. supra note 16, at 15. Professor Johnson does indeed reach some
strange conclusions by his arguments. He decides that consumers will not only be no
better off, but will actually be more confused if annual-rate expressions are imposed. It
is interesting to examine the reason for his conclusion. He argues that unless each and
every type of credit offered to consumers is able to be stated in the annual-rate formula,
the consumer will still be confused. To achieve comparability of rate statements for 90%
of the types of credit offered to consumers would not, in Johnson's eyes, be an improve-
ment. This argument is totally unacceptable. This is a field in which one is grateful for
even a small improvement in the information available to consumers—for even the
slightest correction of deceitful and confusing methods of telling the consumer what he is
paying.
20 Id. at 16.
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ancillary services as free delivery or charge accounts, proves that the
customer can make the distinction between the goods and services he
gets for different product prices in different stores. To think otherwise
is seriously to demean the natural intelligence of our countrymen.
We must, therefore, totally reject the argument that consumers cannot
uncover finance charges buried in the price of items sold on credit.'
Let us now turn to Professor Johnson's second objection, namely
the fact that on many types of credit the precise rate cannot be calcu-
lated in advance, because the conduct of the customer during the life
of the loan or the payment period is unknown. By this is meant that
no one can precisely foretell, on a revolving-credit plan, how much and
on what precise day the customer will buy on this plan and how much
he will pay back. Professor Johnson also argues that "on many types
of consumer credit it is difficult to identify the finance charge accurately
because of various fees or insurance premiums accompanying the pay-
ment of the finance charge. "22
The substance of Professor Johnson's argument completely falls,
however, when the proponents of the annual rate minimize the need
for an expression of the precise annual interest rate equivalent that a
revolving-credit customer actually has paid. It is quite satisfactory, for
purposes of consumer information, if sellers reveal that, in the initial
computation of charges on these revolving plans, they are using a broad
formula which is roughly equivalent to a particular annual rate under
estimated typical payment conditions. So long as some such formula is
worked out by the authorities charged with enforcement, and all sellers
are required to use a similar formula and manner of expression, then
the information available to the public is actually uniform and suffi-
cient. The public would be forewarned that deviations from the
assumed conditions will alter the precise rate paid by each individual.
This arrangement is perfectly feasible and will give the customer
information of exactly the type he needs. What matters is not whether
each consumer gets the mathematically precise rate paid on every single
contract. Instead, it is important that he get an honest estimate with a
margin of error that is relatively small."
21 This rejection is based, of course, upon the assumption that the retail market is
free from collusive pricing. To further strengthen consumer awareness of the problem,
consumer groups have in the past mounted campaigns encouraging customers to demand
discounts for cash, on the principle that if "free" services of credit or delivery are
furnished to a credit customer for exactly the same product price that a cash customer
pays, cash customers are made to subsidize credit customers. Consumer education about
this practice could eventually force retailers into the practice of cash discounts.
22 Johnson, op. cit. supra note 16, at 17. This quotation appears to confirm the
contention that confusion already exists on a vast scale, and that the only way to avoid
multiplication of these deceitful fees and premiums is to force the whole package of fees
to be converted into a single percentage rate.
23 There is no need to fear that there will be a weakening of the competitive position
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Finally, it should be pointed out that some arguments employed
against consumer-credit controls and contract terms miss the point
entirely. For instance, it has of ten been alleged that consumers do
not want and will not use information such as annual-rate percentages.
It may be freely conceded that there are some pieces of information
that the buyer does not now realize are important for him to know. If,
however, it is objectively true that a certain piece of information
is essential to a rational decision, then it is perfectly reasonable for the
law to require it to be given. It then becomes a matter for consumer
education to bring the people to the point where they appreciate the
necessity of making a decision only after considering this information.
It is inconceivable that anyone can sincerely argue that pertinent in-
formation should not be made available just because present-day con-
sumers either do not know enough to ask for it or do not use it where
it is now available. If the consumer-credit industry really thought this
information would have no effect, there would never have been any
controversy at all.'
Fortunately for the consumer, several federal agencies supervising
financial institutions have recently stepped into this matter with a
simultaneous release to all agencies under their control. In it they set
out guidelines to be followed by financial institutions in advertising to
attract deposits from the public. Chief among these directives is the
following:
Interest or dividend rates should be stated in terms of annual
rates of simple interest, and the advertisement should state
whether such earnings are compounded and, if so, the basis of
compounding. Neither the total percentage return if held to
final maturity nor the average annual rate achieved by com-
pounding should be stated unless the annual rate of simple
interest is presented with equal prominence2 5
of individual sellers, since all firms will be required to follow the same formula for the
specific type of credit.
24 Some of the arguments or positions advanced by credit-industry spokesmen are
obviously well calculated to inject confusion and bewilderment into the debate and
should hardly be seriously advanced. For instance, all the talk about how difficult or
impossible it would be for companies to train their people to tell customers the true
annual interest rate sounds hollow when faced with assurances from the publishers of
financial tables that they can add a true annual-rate column to their charts with no
difficulty or delay, and at minimal expense. See generally Mors, Consumer Credit Finance
Charges 108 (1965).
25 See Letter From Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to State
Member Banks, Dec. 16, 1966, in 52 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1774 (1966). The agencies
involved were the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. See also Business Week, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 81. It is also a source of
considerable gratification that the 1967 consumer message from President Johnson
contained a request for a percentage rate disclosure per year.
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Interestingly enough, this joint action was stimulated by a veiled threat
from the Securities and Exchange Commission to apply the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities acts to advertising by financial institutions.
C. Supply Side of the Consumer-Credit Market
To appraise the adequacy of a legislative program which controls
market practices of sellers and lenders, several factors must be con-
sidered. An effective program must be of sufficient scope to encompass
within its provisions all types of credit transactions and institutions,
covering all consumer goods and services. The effective program must
provide for the licensing and supervision of lenders, and must include
appropriate sanctions for abusive activity. Further, the legislation, if it
is going to accomplish its objectives, must indicate what contract
provisions are to be required, permitted, or prohibited; it must also
specify the requirements for inclusion of provisions covering insurance,
extensions, and refinancing, as well as the procedures as to collections,
defaults, and repossessions. Lastly, the legislation must establish the
rate-determination process.
Many of the above factors exist, in varying degrees, in legislation
which of ten takes the shape of small loan laws. The included types of
transactions and institutions, the licensing and related items, and rates
are reasonably well covered. In addition, state requirements relative
to contract terms generally present no great economic issue beyond the
elimination of coercion, fraud, or deceit. Several practices, however,
still remain in the category of unfinished consumer-protection business.
Credit-Rating Bureaus. For their own protection, lenders have
set up a system of credit-rating bureaus. While this system is now
mainly local, it is in the process of being developed into a national
network. In an age in which access to credit can be a very important
aspect of a consumer's economic welfare, a close examination of the
operation of such credit-rating bureaus is necessary, and public control
of them may be required. In too many instances, consumers have been
forced into paying debts by a form of blackmail which insinuates that
the credit-rating-bureau files will forever bar that delinquent customer
from access to credit anywhere in the world. In some of these cases,
payments were made on demands that never should have been honored.
In other cases, reputations of debtors and consumers have been
blackened and credit denied on the basis of completely unjustified
allegations conveyed to the credit-rating bureau. In a recent newspaper
article, Vance Packard wrote:
An acquaintance discovered quite by accident that his
local credit bureau, in a litigation report on him, said he had
been the target of three law suits for failure to meet commit-
400
ECONOMIC ISSUES
ments; on the record he obviously was a bad credit risk. In
fact, the first case was a $5 scare suit back in the nineteen-
thirties over a magazine subscription he had never ordered;
the second involved a disagreement over a $200 lawyer's fee
and was later compromised amicably; the third concerned a
disputed fee he had charged a client, and this suit he won in
court. It took my friend two days of digging to clear his
record with the credit bureau.'
It will be necessary for legal experts to consider ways and means of
protecting the public from potential injury caused by such mistaken
reports in the files of private credit-rating bureaus.
Relationship of Seller, Lender, and Customer. Another aspect of
the supply side of the credit market that calls for regulation and
improvement pertains to the relationship between the seller of goods,
the customer, and the lender of the money used to purchase the goods.
Frequently there is a sharp legal separation between financing agency
and retailer. The lending agency buys the customer's promissory note
from the retailer and becomes a detached "third party" to the transac-
tion. The customer is then in a borrower-lender relationship with the
finance company or bank. The latter is a "holder in due course" of the
customer's promise to pay certain sums of money independent of the
underlying transaction. This principle is sacrosanct in the law in order
to protect the negotiability of commercial paper.
This protected status was abused, however, by some financing
institutions who allowed their credit, their forms, and their good names
to be used by unscrupulous businessmen in soliciting business. Abuses
multiplied, particularly in the home-improvement field. Fly-by-night
operators absconded with down-payments and never completed the
jobs they had contracted for, while the bank or finance agency had the
legal power to compel the customer to keep paying installments on
loans used to pay for goods or work he had never received.
Massachusetts has pioneered in the move to eliminate the divorce
between the sellers of goods and the grantors of credit. Several years
ago the legislature passed and the Governor signed a bill abridging the
holder-in-due-course privilege for any financing agent who takes a
promissory note originating from the purchase of a consumer good.
Such a note must explicitly state that it is a "consumer note."' In
such cases, the financing agent is also liable for any defenses that the
buyer might have against the original seller. The principle on which this
law is based is very simple. Were a bank or finance company to know
20 Packard, Don't Tell It to the Computer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1967, § 6 (Magazine),
p. 44, at 90.
27
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, 12C (Supp. 1966).
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that it could be liable to the ultimate customer, it would be very
concerned about the reliability and honesty of the businessman or
contractor whose installment sales it was financing. This author can
testify, from personal experience with businessmen who were affected
by this law, that it actually had the intended effect—banks became
much more careful about the integrity of the businessmen whose install-
ment paper they purchased.
The interconnected nature of this tripartite transaction is clearer
from the way the British system of hire-purchase works.
Instead of the trader giving credit to the customer he
sells the goods to the finance company and thus obtains his
price in cash. The finance house then hires the goods to the
customer and derives the profits and expenses from the dif-
ference between the cash price, less the deposit, paid to the
trader and the total of the installments received from the
customer. 28
The English have thus been wrestling with essentially the same problem
from a different angle, created by the different historical development
taken by English law. As seen above, the dealer is not considered the
owner of the goods purchased on installment plans by a customer,
because the dealer has executed a contract of sale to a finance company.
However, the finance company has not been considered liable for any
defects in the goods. These were serious gaps in the protection of
English purchasers on the installment plan. Some have suggested a law
making the dealer the agent of the finance company, but even this may
not be enough.'
IV. RATES AND CEILINGS
The two previous sections have treated the nature of consumer
credit and some required conditions that the government must establish
as the framework within which the consumer-credit market must
function. Essentially these conditions encompass full disclosure of
information to buyers, freedom of buyers from fraud, deceit, or coer-
cion, and the prevention of monopolistic or restrictive trade practices
by the credit industry. This latter goal, of course, can only be achieved
by vigorous enforcement of all the antitrust laws.
It is hard to imagine how the consumer-credit market might have
developed in the absence of government regulation. Historical and
economic factors made it necessary to have state regulation of the
small loan business. Restrictions on charges for extensions of credit
28 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection, Stat. Instr., 1962, No.
505, at 166.
20 See generally Bonk & Diamond, The Consumer, Society and the Law (1964).
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began in ancient times and continued through the Middle Ages.'
In the United States, there have been many usury laws which set
maximum ceilings on interest rates somewhere in the range of 6 to 10
per cent. With such ceilings, however, it was totally impossible to make
small loans profitably. Lending to the consumer in small amounts was
much costlier and more risky than business lending. Investigation,
service, collection and other handling costs, plus the market rate of
interest, drove the total cost of a loan to a consumer well above the
ceilings set in traditional usury laws. If the state did not wish to leave
the whole field of small loans to illegal "loan sharks," with interest-rate
charges sometimes as high as 50 or 100 per cent a year, it had to make
it possible for legitimate capital and legitimate lenders to function
within the law. This conflict between law and economic reality led
to the practice of special small loans licensing and to controlled exemp-
tion from ordinary maximum rates. As one author on consumer credit
has written, "The lending of money to consumers is an economic
activity which apparently thrives with or without legal sanction. The
only choice is whether such lending is to be done in large part by loan
sharks or by legitimate lenders."'
Most states now have laws establishing ceilings on the interest
rates and finance charges that may be applied to consumer credit. This
is particularly true of most categories of what are commonly called
"small loans." Presuming, therefore, that the government has done
all it can to establish the proper framework conditions for the credit
market to operate in the public interest, is this enough, or must the
state go further? Should it attempt to fix any rates at all, or should it
leave the whole matter to the forces of competition at the market?
Assuming it is decided that the state should fix some maximum rates,
at what level should these be set? Should they be set deliberately high
in order to make it possible for all, even the most inefficient suppliers
of credit, to function in the market, or should they be set very
low so that only the most efficient suppliers can stay in the market, and
if so will this accentuate whatever trend to monopoly already exists?
Should ceilings be set close to prevailing market prices, or should they
be set rather high in order to prohibit only the most exorbitant charges?
The issue raised by this problem—freedom of pricing—is one on
which hot debate and lively dissent take place among economists.
On the one hand is a school of thought which believes that, apart
30 Those governmental and church restrictions on interest stemmed largely from
several aspects of the borrower-lender relationship in early times; loans were frequently
made to a person in distress, while capital and money were not considered productive
goods as they are today. In fact, in some periods a negative interest rate was paid by the
owner to someone who guaranteed to keep his principal safe for him.
31 Edwards, Consumer Credit Institutions Other Than Banks; in American Financial
Institutions 716 (1951).
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from assuring truthful and accurate information to the customer, the
state should keep out of the credit-pricing process and leave it to the
forces of the market. Some of their objections to state-set rates are
quite persuasive. By what criteria will rates be set? Frequently, they
are set on a cost-plus basis, thus encouraging continuing support even
to inefficient and costly suppliers of this service. In addition, it is
claimed, with a fair amount of evidence, that whatever ceiling is set
automatically becomes a floor, if not the actual price, that the majority
of lenders charge. Is the credit industry to be treated like a public
utility? What theory of a fair price will govern the action of the state
in setting rates? Interminable delays and problems are also involved
when a legislature or an administrative board attempts to set rates.
On the other side of the argument, those who maintain that the
state must set rates point to several considerations: (1) The borrowers
in the market for consumer credit are often not in a financial position
to shop around among competing sellers; (2) they frequently are not
intellectually able to judge or digest the meaning of the information
currently furnished them about rates and terms of credit; 32 and, (3)
the supply side of the credit market is not sufficiently competitive to
trust it to force rates down to a reasonable level 33
The evidence on this third point is voluminous but frequently
contradictory. One writer, however, has summarized his study of
banking concentration by saying:
Examining bank performance in 36 major metropolitan areas,
we found that structural differences among these markets
exert an important influence on bank performance. Market
concentration, especially, was found to be significantly asso-
ciated with the pricing, output, and profits of banks—high
32 Note the significant conclusion on this point from the Juster & Shay study.
"Since the majority of consumers probably fall into the rationed category, there will
be little rate response observable in the population as a whole under existing conditions
. . .. [R]ationed consumers showed virtually no knowledge of rates." Juster & Shay,
Consumer Sensitivity to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investigation 2-3
(1964). "Rationed consumers are defined as those who, given the finance rate, desire
more credit than the major or "primary" credit sources . . . are willing to grant;
unrationed consumers are those whose demand for credit is satisfied by their actual
borrowing from primary credit sources." Id. at 1. See also the types and levels of
ignorance discussed by the Malony Committee Report in the section on hire-purchase and
the English consumer. Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection, supra
note 28, at 168-71.
23 Past efforts of lenders and vendors seem to have been directed to avoiding
competition on price alone. Bartels, op. cit. supra note 6, at 36. "Clear distinction has not
been made between the total charge and the charge for credit service; therefore the
purchaser has not always been critical of price or aware of competitive practices." Id.
at 471. To increase competition it is necessary to require suppliers of credit to state their
charges in ways that facilitate price comparision. Ibid.
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concentration being associated with high loan rates, low rates
on time and savings deposits, and high profits.'
Professor Donald Jacobs, too, has reached the conclusion that changes
in the regulations governing bank operations and changes in entry
restrictions on new banks are necessary if banks are really going to be
able to compete with other financial intermediaries.'
In a recent credit conference in Canada, Professor Wallace P.
Mors stated the case for ceilings as follows:
There are some grounds . . . for believing that interest or
finance rate ceilings might be necessary even with rate and
dollar disclosure. Like most markets, the consumer credit
market is imperfectly competitive. Imperfections are many
and include differentiation of loan services among financing
agencies, limitation of buyer-seller contracts, and borrower
inability to determine price. Rate and dollar disclosure of
finance charges would reduce only one of the many factors
which contribute to market imperfections."
Professor Neufeld, upon whose paper Professor Mors was commenting,
had suggested the desirability of making entry into the credit industry
easier, and of thus avoiding monopoly profits by encouraging compe-
tition. Mors answered this by saying:
Proliferation of installment lenders might increase competi-
tion and reduce monopoly profits without reducing prices to
consumers. Judging from small-loan experience, the greater
the number of loan offices, the smaller is the size of the
average office and the greater is the cost of operations. Any
intensification of competition takes the form of increased
advertising and other forms of sales promotion, rates of
charge remaining at the ceiling level allowed by law."
Several conclusions should be drawn from this discussion. First,
the essence of a credit transaction—delay of payment by the buyer—
should be acknowledged and laws revised to agree with economic
reality. Second, the imperfectly competitive nature of the market
should be faced. On the buyer's side of the market there are imper-
fections because of the lack of knowledge of alternatives in rates,
34 Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, in Studies in Banking Competi-
tion and The Banking Structure 327 (1966).
35 Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation: An Appraisal, in id. at
350.
36 Mors, The Economic Significance of Consumer Credit: Commentary, in Consumer
Credit in Canada 21-22 (Ziegel & 011ey ed. 1966).
37 Id. at 22.
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terms, and sources, and differences in creditworthiness between buyers.
On the seller's side there is a naturally differentiated product because
of the nature or availability of the goods offered, and an artificially
differentiated product created by brand-name advertising; no two
sellers are really selling identical, homogeneous commodities or ser-
vices. Other elements of differentiation between one lender and another
may be: collection methods and policies, ease of obtaining loans, down-
payment and/or security needed. Third, state governments should still
do all in their power to introduce more competitive features into the
market. On the demand side this means (a) encouraging full disclosure
of all pertinent facts, rates, and terms to enable comparisons, and (b)
consumer education to make consumers aware of their choices and
their rights. On the supply side, the state should encourage (a) entry
of new credit grantors, and (b) expansion of the types and fields into
which old and new lenders may enter.
Even after all these improvements in market conditions and
practices have been achieved with the aid of state law, there remains
the nagging question: Will banks and finance agencies engage in
sufficient price competition to keep interest and finance rates at levels
reasonably fair to the consumer? The answer to that question is prob-
ably "no." Even with vigorous regulation by banking authorities and
diligent application of antitrust law to bank structure and conduct, it
seems likely that state control of interest rates on consumer credit will
still be necessary in the public interest. If so, the proper course of
action should be to set rates and not ceilings.
V. CONCLUSION
In the larger context, it is clear that glaring abuses in the con-
sumer-credit field have led to popular demands for state regulation.
This raises an economic issue that far transcends the credit field: How
do we reconcile and relate the interests of business and the public
within the broad context of a free capitalistic economy? It is com-
monly accepted that the general public makes very little distinction
between abuses associated with the financing of a sale and problems
caused by the seller or his product. In the eyes of a buyer, it is all one.
He usually attributes all problems directly and immediately to the
original seller and focuses his complaints accordingly. How much
popular conflict and disenchantment with business is really due to
finance industry abuses is anyone's guess, but in no event is it small.
Otherwise, consumer associations and consumer groups throughout
the fifty states would hardly have made consumer-credit abuses the
focal point of their attack.
Popular disenchantment with business is emphasized by those
economists and social psychologists who are devoting their attention
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to the study of conflict in society and the requirements of social
harmony. One European author recently wrote:
[I]n the majority of cases hire purchase could better have
been avoided. . . . First save, then spend, is as a rule better
than the other way around. This is quite clear in the cases in
which the original harmony between seller and buyer changes
into an open conflict: the buyer has become overburdened
by debts which exceed his Means . . . .
. . . [Most consumers] believe that they are often over-
charged. This brings us to the clash of interests which, next
to that on wages, is perhaps the strongest in contemporary
folklore: the businessman is frequently regarded as the con-
sumers' natural enemy, if not as a swindler."
This is a very disturbing state of affairs, mainly because it is so
unnecessary. If the businessman ceased looking on consumer credit
as an additional source of profit for him, and concentrated his attention
on making a profit from his real business—selling good quality products
to satisfied customers—this suspicion and hostility toward businessmen
in general might diminish or even disappear. It was a sorry commentary
on business when a consumer magazine could headline its credit article
"Bait the Hook with Merchandise."39 Hopefully, businessmen will see
that it is in their own interest to work for an equitable system of
regulation of the consumer-credit field. 4° This will then restore credit
to what it was intended to be—a valuable and convenient tool to
facilitate the production and exchange of goods and services to the
mutual benefit of business and the consumer.
38 Pen, Harmony & Conffict in Modern Society 135-36 (1966).
30 31 Consumer Reports 457-61 (1966).
40 Some actual business "deeds" along this line would be much more effective than
the pious declarations adopted by The Better Business Bureau Managers and widely
published in November 1966. The following is an example of such language:
The Better Business Bureaus decry and regret actions or publicity by
whomsoever, which create the false impression that American Business generally
is opposed to consumer interests—or which unfairly disparage or degrade the
general dependability and integrity of American Business.
. 	 . 	 .	 .
[They] • . . deplore any attempts to set up business and their customers as
antagonists when, in fact, they are dependent on each other for the mutual
benefit of both.
The Bulletin, Better Business Bureau, Nov. 1966, p. 1.
407
